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Abstract
The paper highlights the World Bank's  thinking and worldwide involvement in pension reform.
Both are driven by the Bank's  mandate to help countries develop economically and to reduce
poverty. The Bank has four key concerns in working with clients on pension  policy: (1) short-
term financing and long-term financial viability; (2) effects on economic grow-th; (3) adequacy
and  other  distributive issues; and  (4) political risk  and  sustainability.  In  response to  these
concerns and after review of the three main reform options for unfunded systems - mere PAYG
reform, a rapid and complete shift to a mandatory funded system, and a gradual shift to a multi-
pillar  scheme - the Bank clearly favors the latter approach, but in  a pragmatic  and  country-
specific manner.  When helping to  implement a pension reforn,  the Bank takes full account of
country preferences, circumstances and ownership, bases its  support on sound reform criteria,
links the client assistance with knowledge management, provides training and other measures to
enhance  the  reform  capacity  of  a  country, and  seeks  cooperation with  other  international
institutions.I.  Introduction*
The Bank's mandate is to help countries develop economically and, in so doing, reduce
poverty.  Pension policy  looms large in  any country's  economy and  its citizens' expectations.
Inevitably, the Bank  began to examine how pension policy affects both a country's  economic
development and its  social adequacy.  For  several reasons, the Bank's  interest in the  subject
heightened in the 1980s.  First was the Bank's  work with countries in Latin America who had
begun to question their social policies that often promised a great deal, but delivered little.  Then
came  the regime change  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe and  the  former Soviet Union.  This
increased the Bank's  involvement with countries burdened with dysfunctional pension systems
that economic transition typically made worse. With the unfolding financial and social crisis in
East  Asia, the Bank  started to  assist  these  countries to  move toward  financially  sustainable
schemes for large segments of the society.  In  general, the Bank's  involvement comes in two
contexts:  One is  structural  adjustment  lending, where  the large  influence  of pensions on  a
country's  fiscal, financial and economic life cannot be ignored.  The other is investment lending
directed to helping countries modernize government operations in revenue collection, payment
services and regulatory  supervision.  Understandably,  the Bank  prefers  to  do its  lending  to
governments pursuing economic and social policies that are not self-defeating.
In addition to  the major  1994 staff  study by the Bank's  Research  Department (World
Bank,  1994), the Bank has benefited from the experience that comes from hands-on work with
clients in very different, and often very constraining, starting positions.  As is well known, the
staff study recommended a multi-pillar pension system - optimally consisting of a mandatory
publicly-managed unfunded and a mandatory,  but  privately-managed funded pillar, as well as
supplemental voluntary private funded schemes.  In dealing with real-world starting conditions
and client preferences, the Bank knows it must be flexible in its advice to clients, balancing both
economic growth and social protection objectives.  In this respect, the Bank emphasizes that these
objectives can be best harmonized within a pension structure that diversifies risks, both economic
and political.  Accordingly, we still conclude that the multi-pillar approach to pension reform is
the correct one.
To outline the Bank's  thinking and involvement in pension reform, the structure of the
paper is as follows: Section II highlights the Bank's  principle concerns in pension policy, which
are fiscal, economic, social and political.  Given the multiplicity of reform needs, Section III
briefly reviews the main reform options and presents the central arguments as to why a multi-tier
approach, in general, is considered best.  Section IV outlines the reform support by the Bank for
its client countries, (the main criteria and instruments applied), while Section V concludes.
This paper is a revised version of a World Bank Social Protection Discussion Paper (No. 9807. April) which has
been presented at various conferences worldwide.  This enhanced and enlarged version on the topic takes account of
the specific circumstances in East Asia and special reform needs.  The paper profited from the comments and
suggestions of David Lindeman. Robert Palacios. Louise Fox, and Steen Jorgensen (HDNSP).  All errors are of my
own doingII.  The Bank's  Principal Concerns in Pension Policy
The Bank has five key concerns in working with clients on pension policy: (1) short-term
financing  and  long-term  viability;  (2)  effects  on  economic growth;  (3) adequacy  and  other
distributional issues; and  (4) political risk.
Short-term fiscal concern.  Many countries with pay-as-you-go (PAYG), or unfunded
schemes are facing current-period deficits that are covered b.  :-ome combination of general taxes
or public debt.  But even balanced pension schemes create fiscal problems when high contribution
requirements crowd  out general  government  revenue, such as  income taxes, or  soak  up debt
capacity that would be better used for long-term investment.  Either effect - high  contributions
and  taxes  or  increased  debt  for  current  consumption  - can  harm  a  country's  growth  and
employment prospects.
Short-term imbalances are not restricted to countries with relatively aged populations or as
the consequences  of economic transition.  Countries with favorable  demographics often  have
formal state pension schemes whose actual coverage levels are low but their immediate problems
are not much different than those  faced by more aged societies  - persistent deficits,  delayed
payments, and large infusions from the government budget.
There are no good choices in dealing with short-tern imbalances in a pension scheme.  All
the remedies are well-known, painful,  and resisted by the Bank's  client countries as much as
anywhere else.  The Bank's  main objective  in working with the client in the short-term  is to
ensure that the choices made do not eliminate the possibilities of reaching long-term objectives.
Long-term  fiscal viability.  Most  of Bank's  client countries have unfunded  pension
schemes that have to grapple with projections of lower fertility rates and rising life expectancies.
These trends are world-wide.  In industrialized  countries, these trends will lead to further and
marked increases in alreadv high old-age dependency ratios.  But  other countries - in  Latin
America, Eastern Europe, Central Asia (Bos et al. 1994) - are also projected to experience a
steep rise in the ratio of population aged 65 and above to the population aged 15 to 64, roughly
doubling between now and 2050 in many instances.
To cope with this  demographic trend, the same well-known  and politically  unpleasant
choices exist: a  reduction in the replacement rate; an increase in the retirement age; a  further
increase in the contribution rate; or a further increase in budgetary transfers financed by higher
taxes or lower non-pension expenditure.  While a solution to the aging problem in industrialized
countries along these lines appears feasible to some fiscal economists (Chand and Jaeger, 1996),
proposing parametric reforms linked with a partially-capitalized central system which allows for a
constant contribution rate ignores the political economy of pension  reform and other concerns.
Though the current old-age dependency ratio in many developing countries does not necessitate
an immediate reaction, it provides  a window  of opportunity for  an early revision in  pension
policy.
Economic concerns.  As empirical  evidence from developed and developing  countries
suggests,  poorly-designed  public  pension  systems  can  distort  life-cycle  savings  and  work
decisions, leading to dead-weight losses, lower output level, and a lower growth path of output.More importantly, the  financing of  publicly-mandated pension  schemes can  affect  aggregate
savings and capital market development, both of which can affect economic growth.
Labor  Tax Effects.  If the pension scheme has a weak correspondence  between
contributions and benefits, younger workers will treat contributions as a labor tax, leading to both
evasion and, in some instances, less work.  In addition, pension design often and inappropriately
encourages early  retirement (Gruber and  Wise, 1997).  In  countries with  weak  control  and
collection  power, these labor market  effects exacerbate  shifts towards  informal  labor market
activities that limit a country's growth rate through higher transaction costs (including corruption)
and  the use  of  inferior production technology.  In countries  where  enforcement  is  stronger,
globalization has increased the options for labor tax avoidance.  Highly-skilled labor can change
residence and employers can shift the locus of production.
These labor market effects are not limited to  PAYG schemes.  Mandated funded
schemes can suffer from high administrative costs and bad asset management deriving from either
inadequate regulation or explicit government interventions.  These can impose an implicit labor
tax.  Even modest return differences, of 2 percentage points  over the  life cycle,  for example,
imply an important implicit tax component which can reach  50 percent and  above of lifetime
earnings.
Savings Effects.  In the area of savings, uncompensated transfers  from the state
budget to ailing pension schemes may lower aggregate savings and crowd out a country's ability
to borrow for investment.  Although the evidence about the long-term effects on saving rates is
mixed, unanticipated increases in PAYG schemes, including the  start-up, are  likely to have a
permanent effect on the level of the capital stock and hence output.  By the same token, a shift
from PAYG toward funded schemes may raise the capital stock and future output.
Even  without  any  effect  on  saving  volume,  comprehensive  coverage  with  high
replacement rates  under an unfunded  scheme reduces the  need for  additional  old-age saving
devices and may impede the emergence of pension funds and similar financial market institutions,
retarding the development of a sophisticated financial market.  There is empirical  evidence that
financial market development and economic growth are closely related, and evidence from Chile
suggests that the most positive value of the shift to funded  pensions was the  increase in  the
efficient use of existing capital (Holzmann, 1997a).
Distributive concerns.  Ideally, the total population should have access to some old-age
income, at least at the poverty level, and all workers should have a portion of  their earnings
replaced, consistent with their work record and contribution effort.  Four typical departures from
this principle often occur.
First, in many low and middle-income countries, the earnings-related scheme is restricted
to the relatively well-off - civil servants and selective parts of the formal economy.  Directly
through budget subsidies and indirectly through public pricing, these systems can impose unfair
burdens on the less well-off outside the formal economy, while providing  them no systematic
support in old age.
4Second, privileges for special  sectors - in  particular, earlv retirement  - pose similar
problems.  For some occupations, a  lower retirement  age for strenuous  work may have some
distributive justification.  Pure cross-financing by means of a common contribution rate, however,
provides no incentives to employers to change the production technology, nor do the employers'
prices reflect social costs.  Furthermore, privileges usually are extended to all employees in the
sector, including administrative staff.
Third, poorly-designed pension schemes can actually lead to regressive results, including
higher payoffs to the relatively well-off with their higher life expectancies,  steep age-earnings
profiles and uncompensated credit for higher education in pension calculations.
Fourth, public pension schemes often distinguish on the basis of gender - for example,
earlier retirement ages for women or differences in survivor benefits - or, on the basis of age,
marital or  other differences in  status.  Even if  these  categorical rules  reflect real underlying
differences  or  even just  deeply-held  preferences,  the  question  arises  as  to  whether  those
differences or preferences can be honored in ways that are less distortionary  and in which the
price to society is more transparent.
In  addition,  there  are  issues  of  inter-generational  equity.  Some  inter-generational,
redistributive  effort may have  a justification  after  wars and  during  economic  transition,  but
repeated increases in the level of generosity can only  reduce capital formation and, hence, the
output level for current and future generations. This is particularly pressing  when demographic
"shocks,"  such as the baby-boom generations, either create an important burden  for the future
working generation when the baby-boomers retire, or leave the baby-boomers worse off because
pension promises are adjusted downward.
Political risks.  Public pensions are subject to many sources of political risk.  First, and
most obvious, has been the granting of relatively  high  benefits to  existing  retirees  when the
system  is  not  mature  and  contribution  revenue  easily  covers  expenditures,  combined  with
comparable promises  to  future  retirees  that cannot  be  met  at  reasonable  contribution  rates.
Second is the excessive responsiveness of benefits to short-term conditions  of the government
budget.  This occurs in both  highly-developed and  less-developed countries  alike  as recently
experienced in member countries of the European Union when  struggling with the Maastricht
fiscal criteria.  Third is the excessive responsiveness of benefits to the long-run condition of the
government budget, making it unlikely that the current promises toward the baby-boomers can be
kept.
Fourth,  many schemes that  have been funded  to  some degree  have been  depleted of
accumulated assets through outright  diversion or a  low rate of return,  making the  originally-
promised benefits impossible.  This  happened  widely  in Latin  America,  Africa and to  some
extent in Europe and Asia.  In contrast, some countries such as the Netherlands, have successfully
run a  funded  pension  scheme  for  decades.  As  we  face  the  prospects  of  funded  schemes,
mandatory or even voluntary, in many transition and developing economies, we have to ask some
hard  questions  about  a  country's  financial  institutions  and  regulatory  capacity,  and  the
governance structure to shield pension funds from private and public misuse.
5III.  Multi-pillar Reform: A Welfare-enhancing Approach to Reform
The major options for reform are essentially three-fold. The first is to reform the PAYG system.
The second is a rapid and nearly complete shift to  a mandatory funded system.  The third is a
gradual  shift to a multi-pillar scheme, in which there is some mix between PAYG and funded
pensions.  The exact  mix  will depend on  a  country's  starting conditions  and  constraints in
financing the transition.
PAYG-Only Reform  With notable exceptions, many of needed reforms can, in principle,
be  addressed by reforming the PAYG system,  i.e., by changing the parameters of the pension
system (such a retirement age, accrual factors, length of assessment period, indexation, etc.).  The
need to undertake an early and long-lasting PAYG reform in view of population aging, and the
instruments  to be applied  have been known for many years  (Holzmann,  1988).  The political
unattractiveness,  however,  to  engage  in  a  comprehensive  PAYG  reform  -the  fiscal  and
economic gains would be harvested at the time when the responsible politician is already out of
office  - while undertaking  continuous marginal changes creates a  time  consistency problem.
Politicians  cannot make a  convincing commitment that the proposed "parametric"  reform is a
lasting one (i.e., it puts the scheme on a sound, long-term financial basis), and that they have no
incentive to change the benefit/contribution structure for political reasons in the future. Given this
credibility problem, individuals have an incentive to oppose a "parametric" reform from the very
beginning.
Examples of marginal parametric reform attempts, many of which failed or came about
only  after  intensive  political  fighting, are abundant.  A  small  selection  of  current  examples
includes the fight over retirement ages in Japan, France and the Czech Republic, the halted reform
by the new Germany government, and the very recent pension reforrn in Austria which provides
some fiscal breathing space due to changes in accrual factor and assessment period. but no long-
tern  solution.  Most incremental PAYG reforms  also fail to  deal  with  most  of a traditional
system's  labor market distortions and cross-subsidies among competing groups.
Possibly, a more promising strategy for PAYG reform employs a "paradigm shift"-  that
is, putting forth a conceptual structure that changes the usual terms of debate.  A paradigm shift is
inherent  in proposals to  move to  a Chilean-style funded  scheme.  The close  analogue in  the
PAYG  context is the construct of Notional Defined  Contribution accounts  (NDC), which  has
been enacted or is being discussed in Mongolia, Latvia, Sweden, Italy, Poland (Plenipotentiary,
1997), China  and possibly Russia.  The NDC approach appropriates the vocabulary of funded
individual  accounts and uses it to define PAYG promises.  In doing  so, it makes explicit the
implicit actuarial mathematics of any PAYG system.  This extra transparency helps both policy-
makers and the public to understand the trade-offs inherent in any PAYG arrangement.X
'In a NDC system,  a long-term  contribution  rate  is established.  Each  year,  contributions  are recorded  in each
contributing  worker's account,  just as if these  were  contributions  to a funded  account. In addition,  each  year,  the
account grows  according  to a "notional  rate  of return." That rate  of return  could  be growth in GDP,  growth  in
average wages,  or growth  in aggregate  wages,  each  having  different  fiscal  implications  under demographic,
employment  and  wage shocks. At retirement,  the accumulation  in a person's  account is translated  into  an annuity  or
payment  stream,  calculated  on an implicit  interest  rate and cohort-specific  mortality  tables  in a manner  similar  to a
funded  account. Because  the mortality  tables  are recalibrated  to recognize  increased  longevity,  the effects  of
longevity  gains will  be automatically  incorporated  into  the pension  system.
6Even when the NDC approach is employed, however, some basic defects of the PAYG-
only  approach  may  remain,  in  particular,  those  relating  to  savings  and  capital  formation.
Furthermore, it is unclear whether or not the NDC  approach can fully deal with labor market
distortions, so long  as the notional rate of return continues to fall below the rate of return in
funded schemes.  In the face of changing demographics, the NDC approach demands the creation
of a "buffer fund"  - a partial reserve that forces baby-boom cohorts to pay something close to
the present value of the equilibrium price for their benefits.  Can such funds be better immunized
against political manipulation and low rates of return than the earlier and analogous attempts in
Canada, Japan, Sweden and elsewhere?
Shift to a Fully-funded System A full shift towards a funded scheme addresses, in principle, all
the incentive and most  distributional issues, as well as the issues of savings, intergenerational
equity and capital market formation that PAYG-only reform, including the NDC approach, fails
to achieve. A full shift toward a funded system brings with it, however, three major problems.
The first  is  the  repayment of the public  debt implicit in  the commitment to  not  only
current retirees, but to workers who have acquired rights under the PAYG regime as well.  The
second is whether a country's financial infrastructure, regulatory capacity, and political economy
are equal to the task.  The third is whether the risks in financial market fluctuation are adequately
and explicitly addressed.  All three issues are also present under a multi-pillar reform, but are
diminished and more manageable in a gradual and partial privatization approach.
The first issue - the need to pay for old pension obligations while setting aside assets for
future pensions - can be addressed in four ways (Holzmann, 1997b). Briefly stated, they are:
*  partial  default  on  promises  to  existing workers,  particularly  younger  ones,  in  a  manner
consistent with inevitable changes in the PAYG scheme;
- use of proceeds from privatization of collectively-held assets to fill the fiscal gap in the early
years of the transition;
*  a controlled amount of debt financing during the early years to spread the costs of transition
into the future when the country"s growth rate will have been enhanced by other aspects of the
reform - better labor market incentives, less tax evasion, and more efficient use of existing
capital; and
*  fiscal measures outside the pension system - by raising other taxes, such as the VAT, or by
cutting other government spending
The second major issues concerns the country's  institutional capacity and political will to
regulate funded pensions  so that these both provide real economic security for the contributing
workers  and  truly  help  build  competitive  capital  markets.  It  takes  strong  governmental
institutions  to  enforce  basic ground rules.  It  also  takes  a  political  willingness  to  let  old-
established enterprises  fail.  Pension reform should  not  be  used to  prop inefficient  firms  or
concentrate control of capital in the hands of a select few.
The third issue is market fluctuation and risk.  By their nature, market-driven returns will
vary  from period  to  period,  and some companies  will  go bankrupt.  These failures  are the
7analogues to the demographic and political risks facing PAYG systems.  Governments can and
should dampen these risks in mandatory-funded pensions by imposing a regulatory framework
and supervisory institutions which, at least initially, may have to be strict (Vittas 1996), and may
have to specify diversification rules and possibly require that workers, as they get older, move
from equity to bond portfolios.  Governments may have to take on the responsibility of providing
indexed bonds to make fully-funded systems viable.  Of course, the larger the funded system, the
more the government will feel compelled to constrain what the pension funds are allowed to do.
A  shift  towards  a  fully-funded  system  may  still  be  feasible  under  certain  limited
conditions:  the  implicit  debt  in  the  inherited  pay-as-you-go  scheme  is  relatively  small  and
credibility in reform of the unfunded scheme is low; and potential proceeds from privatization are
sufficiently high to substantially co-finance the transition. Such conditions may apply to Bolivia,
Mexico, and Kazakhstan where a Chilean-type reform is underway or in preparation.  But under
such  circumstances,  the  Bank  watches  very  closely  to  ensure  that  distributive,  fiscal,
administrative and regulatory concerns are met.
Multi-pillar System.  The observed difficulties of both PAYG-only reform and the fully-
funded approach leads naturally to a discussion of the third major approach to reform - a multi-
pillar  system,  in  which  part of the mandatory  system  is PAYG and  in  which a  distinct  and
separate component is funded.  Multi-pillar systems on a mandatory or contractual basis already
exist in advanced  countries such as Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and  the
UK,  and  most of  the recent  reforms in Latin  America  and Eastern Europe are based  in  this
approach  (Queisser,  1998,  Rutkowski,  1998).  The  central issues  are  the  welfare  economic
implications of such a reform approach.
While it can be argued that no actual pension reform can be Pareto-efficient - someone's
consumption at some moment in time will be made worse-off, even if future generations, on the
whole, will be better-off  - a reform along the  lines of a multi-pillar system can be welfare-
enhancing.  I would argue that the multi-pillar approach has several distinct advantages: it allows
a distinction to be made between poverty reduction and income replacement goals; it builds risk
diversification into a country's  provisions for retirement income support; it minimizes the burden
of fiscal transition while preserving many of the economic gains of the fully-funded approach;
and it brings to the reform discussion some clear  gains for younger workers and those who are
facing labor income losses from globalization.
The multi-pillar  approach allows the  reforming  country to  delineate  between  poverty
reduction and income replacement goals.  The former could be achieved through relatively small
PAYG schemes or general revenue financed citizens'  pensions.  The latter could be assigned to
mandatory funded pensions with contribution rates of 10 to 13 percent.  Unfortunately, most of
the reforming countries so far have chosen to target relatively high replacement rates, which has
given  the  PAYG  pillar  the  dual  duty  of  poverty  reduction  and  contributing  to  income
replacement.
The principal advantage of a multi-pillar pension scheme lies in risk diversification.  Not
all of the population's  retirement portfolio will be held hostage to political and demographic risk,
if only because the PAYG system no longer looms so large in the country's  public finances. As
emphasized above, most or all of the same issues of regulation, capital market development and
8market fluctuation also exist in a multi-pillar approach and require solutions.  Because it is only
part of a larger system,  however, the funded component can operate with fewer govermnental
constraints on the long-run investment options offered to contributors.
More  importantly, the multi-pillar approach recognizes that  countries face a variety  of
risks over the long term and no one instrument can fully anticipate all those risks.  In fact, some
non-systemic  risks, such  as catastrophes  may not be  diversified  at all.  The following  table
summarizes how a multi-pillar approach balances long-run risks.
Table 1:  Responsiveness to Main Risks
Unfunded  Schemes  Fully Funded  Schemes
Macroeconomic  Risks
Negative  output shocks  lower  revenue,  but effects  on  Possible  effects  on financing  which can
individuals  can be mitigated  not be mitigated
Unemployment  lower  revenue,  but effects  on  no effect on financing,  but concerned
individual  can be mitigated  individual  receives  future lower
benefits
Low  wage growth  lower  revenue,  but effects  on  No effect on financing  and current
individual  can be mitigated  benefit  level
Financial  crisis (depression,  possible  lower  revenue,  Accumulated  stock reduced  or even
war, hyper  inflation,  natural  but effects  on individual  can be  elimninated
disaster)  mitigated
Low  rates of return  no direct  effects on financing  and  No effects  on financing  but lower
benefits  benefits
Demographic Risks
Higher  dependency  ratio  deteriorating  financing  no direct  effects  on financ;ra and
benefit  level
Lower  labor  force  higher  wages  and future  benefit  Lower  returns  and  future benefit  levels
levels
Political Risks
Contract  change  - easy  difficult
Responsiveness  to short  and  high  low
long  term  budget constraints
In mere economic terns,  a portfolio of (unfunded) social security wealth and (funded)
financial wealth can be welfare enhancing by reducing the income risk.  While financial assets are
internationally highly correlated, national wages and national as well as international financial
markets are not.  As a result, a multi-pillar scheme provides a better risk/return trade-off than
single pillars, including an international financial portfolio (even if abstracting from the exchange
rate risk).  The Annex provides illustrative calculations which support the view not to put all eggs
into one basket, even if it is an international one.
Another major advantage to the multi-pillar approach is that the transition problems are
markedly lessened.  Modeling suggests that, for most countries examined so far (Latvia, Hungary,
Poland, Croatia, and Mongolia), some sensible PAYG reforms, such as increased retirement ages
are enough to free up space for a funded component of significant size by the end of a decade of
gradual transition.  Some combination of proceeds from privatization and modest debt financing
can fill the fiscal gap in the first 10 years.  In some of these countries, the  transition is helped by
temporarily favorable demographics, a window of opportunity which will close soon
9The multi-pillar approach brings with it most of the economic gains typically associated
with the fully-funded approach.  Though some of the implicit pension debt is made  explicit in
ways that must be repaid, the gains from reduced labor market distortions, especially improved
compliance, improved financial markets and, perhaps, higher aggregate savings compensate.  The
pension  reforms  also  engender  parallel  reforms  in  broader  economic  areas,  such  as
macroeconomic  stabilization,  comprehensive  liberalization  and  public  sector  reform  and
institution-buildingr.
A multi-pillar approach also offers something to younger generations - the prospect of a
relatively high return on some of their contributions.  In Hungary, this was the decisive factor that
broke the political logjam in favor of fundamental reforms  in the PAYG system.  Things that
were not possible  by themselves  became possible  in  a  larger package that included  a funded
component.  The same pattern is repeating itself in Poland.
Implicit in the multi-pillar approach is a means to mitigate fears of globalization.  Most
individuals  receive their  income  from  work,  focusing  their  interest  on  high  wages  and  job
security.  Any negative feedback from pursuing such goals or from high taxation on capital is
generally ignored.  Shifting to funded pensions broadens the citizenry's perspective, encouraging
them to understand the role of, and returns to, capital.  This is particularly critical in a world in
which workers think they are experiencing the disciplines of globalization on wage  levels, but
may not fully appreciate the efficiency gains (Holzmann, 1  997b).
10IV. Implementing Reform in Client Countries
Identifying a dominant reform approach falls short of implementing it in a client country.
Implementation  requires  flexibility  through  taking  account  of  country's  preferences  and
circumstances.  It  also  requires  a  comprehensive  and  complex  tool-kit  which  ranges  from
assistance  with  design  issues,  getting  the  projections  correct,  institution-building,  to
communicating and improving the perception of the reform effects, most importantly by financial
markets. This chapter reviews very briefly main support criteria and instruments developed and
applied by the Bank.
Country preferences, circumstances and ownership  Even the best technically prepared
pension reform is bound to fail if does not reflect the preferences of a country, and is not credible
to the population at large.  The preparation of a pension  reform has to be done by the country
itself, by its politicians and technicians, and has to have the support of population.  Outsiders,
such as the Bank, can assist with  advice based  on world-wide experience, but  ownership and
public support must come from the client country.  Equally important, the reforTn environment
differs starkly among countries, both with regard  to  starting conditions (such  as the inherited
system and the stage of financial market developments) and the implementation capacity.  This
implies  that  each reform will  differ  from  country  to  country.  This requires  flexibility and
innovation and disallows the application of blue-prints.  While all recent pension reforms in Latin
America and Eastern Europe share common characteristics, none of them is identical.
Accordingly, the  Bank  has  supported  different  reform  approaches.  For  example, in
Lithuania, the Bank has helped the government fashion and implement a relatively modest PAYG
scheme with a redistributional formnula,  and continues to work with the government in developing
the regulatory framework for voluntary supplementary schemes; a mandatory second pillar is left
to future work.  A similar route is suggested for the old Bulgarian, the young  Korean, and the
nascent Thai unfunded scheme.  In Latvia, the  reforrn has taken the route of PAYG notional
accounts with  a very modest funded add-on.  -In Hungary and  Poland, the mandatory  funded
component will be about one-third of the total package.  In Kazakhstan, the reform contemplates
a complete replacement of the PAYG with a funded scheme.  A similar approach is supported in
Bolivia, Peru and Mexico while the reform plans in Argentina and Costa Rica are directed toward
a two-pillar approach.
Sound reform criteria  While the Bank reacts flexibly to country preferences and circum-
stances, it does not support all reforms proposed  by  a country. Too much is  at stake for the
current and future retirees, and  the country as a whole, to  engage in a pension reform which is
likely to fail in social and economic terms.  The central criteria used by the Bank to judge the
soundness of a proposal are fourfold:
(i)  Does the reform meet  distributive  concerns?  This  includes an  assessment  of the
pension level for beneficiaries remaining under the old scheme and the prospective pension level
under the new scheme; the level of the proposed minimum pension; indexation procedures; the
availability  of  periodic  payments  (annuities  and  phased  withdrawal);  and  the  provision  of
disability and survivors pensions.
(ii)  Is the macro and  fiscal  policy accommodating  the reform sound?  This  includes
detailed projections of the long-term fiscal sustainability; an assessment of the proposed measures
11to  finance  the  transition  toward  funded  pension  (the  level  of  transitory  debt financing  and
budgetary financing); and the proposed reforns  of revenue and expenditure programs.
(iii) Can the administrative structure operate the new multi-tier pension scheme?  This
includes an assessment of the capacity to levy contributions, to channel them to the dii .- ent tiers,
and to pay benefits in a timely fashion; the level of computerization; the availability of personal
identification numbers (important for individualized accounts both on notional and funded basis);
and the level of competence and training needs for administrative staff.
(iv)  Are  the  regulatory and  supervisory arrangements  and  institutions  in  place  to
operate the funded pillar with acceptable risks?  This includes an assessment of the regulatory
agencies,  and  their  strength  of  supervision  and  intervention  po.--ers for  pension  funds  and
insurance companies; the criteria for entry and exit of funded pension institutions; the availability
of sound custodian  banks;  and an  assessment  of the  proposed  internal  versus external  asset
management, fee  structure, and more.
Linking  client  assistance with  knowledge  management  The  Bank  is  increasingly
involved in pension reforms in all regions of the World. On the one hand, this exposure requires
that cutting-edge knowledge be available within the Bank to provide the best advice, to address
the specific needs of a country, and to come forward with innovative proposals for solutions.  On
the other hand, the lessons learned in each country provide a unique set of information which can
be productively applied in other reforms.  In order to do so, this requires the analysis and sharing
of information within the Bank and with the outside world.  This very concept  'QKnowledge
Management," however, is part of the new World Bank, and, to this  end, various projects  are
currently under elaboration, inter alia:
A "primer on pension reform" which will provide comprehensive information on  design
and implementation issues, including case studies of country experiences for the benefit of Bank
task managers as well as politicians and technicians in client countries. The first version  of the
Pension Primer  in the form of an  open binder will  available in the  web in early  1998, with
continuous revisions and updates of the individual papers 2.
For the dissemination and sharing of reform-related information, besides the traditional
means of Working  Papers and publication of Conference and Workshop  Proceedings, a major
emphasis is being placed on the development of a World Wide Web/Intemet site. Regional hubs
on reform lessons, starting with Latin America (Mexico) in the coming months will be  linked
with  the Bank  Web Site and  the  web pages  under  completion in  the  Human Development
Department (HDD) and the Poverty and Economic Management (PREM) networks.
Raising awareness and providing training  A major challenge for any comprehensive
pension reform  is the creation  of an awareness  of  the issues among  the  politicians and  the
population at large.  And once the seeds for a pension  reform process  are sewn, to  train the
technicians  in  the  future  public  and  private  pension-related  institutions  for  the  new  skill
requirements in  administration, regulation, and supervision.  The activities by the Bank, headed
by the Economic Development Institute (EDI), and using in-house and outside expertise, include:
An annual workshop together with the Harvard Institute for International Development.
This workshop to brainstorm with leading world experts on frontier issues in pension reform is
targeted at the staff of multi-national institutions and  client countries.  The first two EDI-HIID
First versions of primer papers can be found on the World Bank web site (http://www.worldbank.org/sp/).
12workshop of July 1997 and 1998 were over-subscribed; got a very high rating by the participants;
and will be repeated with a focus on implementation in  June 1999.
Regional workshops and conferences, partly in cooperation with new partners,  serve to
discuss broad policy issues in the pension area; have a more narrow technical agenda  (as the
Pension  Modeling Workshop  in Malaysia  in early  1998); focus on  implementation  issues  of
pension  reform (as  a  conference  series  in  Mexico);  or  draw  lessons  from  regional  reform
experiences (such as a recent  conference on the  transition economies  in  Eastern Europe  and
Central Asia in November 1998 in Vienna).
Other training activities  include  the joint  Bank-Vienna Institute  program, the  specific
World Bank Module on pension reform, and the SPRITE program.
Enhancing  the  reform  capacity  Much  of  the' knowledge  transfer  occurs  through
activities in the field through technical assistance (TA), project implementation and other loan
activities.  Missions staffed by experts with  strong backgrounds in  pension economics,  fiscal
administration, and  regulatory and financial markets provide guidance to the client country and
help to identify institution-building needs.  These missions also provide  follow-up by  resident
consultants,  increasingly  from  prior  reform  countries  (and  often  in  collaboration  with
multinational or bilateral institutions and donors).  The objective is not only to provide advice,-
Aide Memoires for the shelf - but to strengthen the local reform capacity and ownership in the
reform.  Examples include economic and policy analysis, legislation, and technical skills, (e.g.,
the use of projection models).
Quantitative assessments of the long-run fiscal and distributive implications of the current
pension  scheme and of  alternative schemes under  consideration are  basic ingredients  of  any
reform process. It is almost an iron rule that only when politicians and the public at large are
informed  about the medium  and  long-term  financial  unsustainability  of  the  current  pension
scheme, can a more-than-marginal reform approach be launched.  Because most client countries
with an ailing pension scheme do not possess the required model, the World Bank has developed
a generic pension model (PROST: Pension Reform Simulation Toolkit), which, once filled with
country-specific data  and  system  information, provides  long-term  projections  of  the  current
scheme and main alternatives including a reformed unfunded scheme and the introduction of a
(partially or fully) funded scheme.
It  goes without saying that  the  Bank's  lending  activities are  its  central instrument  to
support pension reforms in many countries, ranging from TA loans (financing comprehensive and
extended technical advice), project loans (financing for example the computerization of pension
administration),  diverse reform  implementation  loans  (financing  TA,  training  and  technical
equipment) to adjustment loans (financing, in part, the transition costs towards the new pension
scheme).  The latter lending instrument with sizable amounts has been used in countries such as
Argentina, Mexico, Uruguay, Hungary, Russia and recently Brazil.
Strengthening  partnerships  The Bank approach is also characterized by an out-reach to
old and new international partners in order to strengthen the reform message and impact.  In the
past,  countries  were  too  often  confronted  with  sharply  conflicting  advice  from  different
international institutions and bilateral  donors.  The  approach by  the  Bank is to  engage  in  a
constructive dialog in order to determine areas of agreement and difference, and to examine the
13reasons  behind  them  (such  as  differences  in  objectives,  values,  assumptions,  view  on  the
functioning  of  the  world,  or  simply  constituency).  This  approach  will  not  dissipate  all
disagreements, and, perhaps, should not do so. The outcome of such a dialogue, however, should
better allow the client country to assess the differences and to make its own judgment.
To this end, the dialogue has been strengthened with the International Labor Organization
(ILO),  which  traditionally  has  been  much  opposed  to  enhancing  funded  provisions  at  the
detriment of unfunded provisions.  One forum for such an exchange of views has been created by
ISSA and  it's  "Stockholm Initiative"  - a worthwhile  attempt to  create  a new  consensus on
"Social  Security." (ISSA,  1998).  A  conference in  December  1997, jointly  organized  by the
OECD and ILO, with Bank participation, carried the dialogue further.  Needless to say, intensive
contacts with regard to reform design and implementation exist with the Banks sister institution,
the IMF.  In the past, the fiscal stance of the IMF and the way general governrnent deficits are
defined have hampered the move towards funded pensions.  A recent note by the Fiscal Affairs
Department to  the IMF  Board,  however, has recognized  that  reform-induced  deficits  do  not
reflect an expansionary fiscal policy if it is caused by a reduction in the implicit pension debt.  To
communicate this economic insight to the international financial markets requires a partnership
with the IMF, which the Bank has launched.  More recently cooperation in the pension area have
been established with the regional development Banks, in particular with EBRD, IAD and ADB.
V. Concluding remarks
At the end of the 20th century, the world of pension reform has changed  dramatically.
While 10 years ago, a move towards funded pension schemes was considered an adventure taking
place in a few countries of the world only, today such an approach is being discussed in many
developed and developing countries.  And quite a  few have startec  e reforr.  preparation or
implementation.  This  change reflects  the reaction  to  the unsuccessful  reforms  of  unfunded
schemes,  emerging pitfalls  with  centralized  funded  schemes,  and  the  prospect  that  a  move
towards decentralized funded schemes contributes to economic growth. The World Bank, with its
development mandate, has contributed to the intellectual discussion and assisted the reforms in
many client countries.  As  far  as pensions  are concerned,  it  appears that  the  textbooks on
economic development and social protection may have to be rewATitten.
While the reforms  en  route signal the feasibility  of  a comprehensive  pension  reform
approach which gives funded retirement provisions an  important place,  the efforts  required to
make it a success and to keep the risks limited are sometimes underestimated. In view of the risks
each country faces, making the move towards partially or fully-ftmded pension scheme a success
is imperative.  While the recipe for this success is not fully known, the suggested ingredients are:
flexibility, ownership and credibility,  sound reform  criteria, knowledge transfer, and  capacity
building.  Discarding those ingredients while wanting to keep up with the neighboring countries
- a dangerous policy band-wagon effect - may be expensive in social, economic and political
terms.
International institutions dealing with pension reform issues have an important role to play
in maximizing opportunities while limiting risk.  Partnership between these institutions is very
important for at least three reasons:
(i)  Countries receiving conflicting advise and information from those institutions may be
prone to discard them altogether, increasing the risk for reform failure.  This calls for cooperation
14among the international institutions, defining the areas of consensus, and pin-pointing the areas of
disagreement.  This allows the countries to make their own informed decisions.
(ii)  In general, while our  knowledge of  pension  reform-related issues and  population
aging has increased over the years, it is far from complete. The Bank is aware that more work and
innovation has to be done to make the proposed reform direction a social and economic lasting
success.  Main items on the policy research agenda and pilot projects include:  A reduction in the
administrative costs of funded provisions, and the proposals included clearing house solutions for
contribution and  benefit  administration,  competitive  bidding,  and bulk  investment  solutions;
Enhanced  governance,  regulations  and  supervision  of  pension  funds  arrangements;  A  cost-
effective provision  of annuities and price indexation;  and Arrangements to reduce the informal
labor market activities to make pension coverage universal.  Only if we succeed in solving these
and other challenges will social security be able of live-up to its promises.  Joining forces to use
the comparative advantages in skills and information to address those issues avoids duplicating
our efforts.
(iii) International diversification  of pension  fund  assets can importantly reduce the risk
while increasing the rate of return, and can, thus, be welfare enhancing.  The non-synchronized
aging between developed and developing countries may allow us to go a step further.  Sending
more funds now from the OECD-type baby-boom countries to emerging economies could provide
high  returns  for the one and higher  capital formation  for the other.  Making  sure that these
conditions are met and that the funds are repaid at the end could be a new role for international
institutions, and their collaborative efforts.
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16ANNEX - The Advantage of a Multi-pillar Retirement Asset Structure
The  following  tables  provide  straightforward  and  simple  estimates  of  the  performance  of
alternative retirement assets, and the risk/return trade-off under  alternative portfolio  structures.
The basic data are annual returns on social security assets (proxied by real wage growth), fixed
interest assets (proxied by government bonds), and  capital assets  (proxied by returns  of listed
shares) in the 4 main industrialized countries.  Since the rates of return are measured in national
currency, the estimates abstract from the exchange rate risk.  On the other hand the (high) wage
growth reflects the development of the past with rising  labor force participation and moderate
aging. The data is taken from Thompson (1998), and covers the years 1953 to 1995.
Several features emerge:
*  Real growth exceeds real interest rates (except in the USA), but is much smaller the capital
return.  The same order exists for the variance of the retirement assets.  Since all three returns
are little or even negatively correlated, this suggests gains in a portfolio approach (Table Al).
*  Financial market  returns between  Germany, UK  and  US are positively and mostly  highly
correlated (Table A2). As a result, a (equal share) international portfolio reduces the variance,
but not very much.
- Portfolios with (fixed share) national portfolios of social security and financial assets reduce
both return but  even more the risk.  Compared to  an international financial portfolio, the
variance  is  reduced between  1/3  to  1/6.  Diversifying  social  security with  international
financial assets leaves the return largely unchanged, but roughly halves the risk Table A4).
*  Selecting the portfolio shares which maximize the return/standard deviation (minimizes the
coefficient of variance) implies lower return but much lower risk.
- The high share of social security assets - the unfunded portion - is the result of relatively high
wage growth, but most importantly of low variance , and low  or even negative correlation
with financial assets. Even if the real wage growth were to become very low (say 0.5 percent,
and other relations remained constant), the estimated unfunded share would stay in the range
of 10 to 50 percent.
Table Al:  Performance of alternative retirement assets, 1953-95
Germany  Japan  UK  USA
Rates of return
Wages (unfunded scheme)  4.8  5.2  3.6  1.0
Interest rates (government  3.9  3.8  1.9  2.3
bonds)
Capital return (listed shares)  10.1  10.8  10.8  9.8
Variance
Wages (unfunded scheme)  11.9  37.7  8.8  6.0
Interest rates (government  1.3  5.4  9.3  8.2
bonds)
Capital return (listed shares)  689.5  612.1  638.6  333.2
Correlation
Wages and interest rate  -0-086  0_238  0.194  -0.197
Wages and capital return  -0.077  0.186  -0.025  0.202
Interest rate and capital return  0.070  0.085  -0.167  0.130
17Table A2: Correlation of financial market returns between countries, 1993-95
Germany  Japan  UK  USA
Germany  1.000  0.240  0.552  0.542
Japan  0.349  1.000  0.041  0.060
UK  0.473  0.153  1.000  0.617
USA  0.309  -0.084  0.225  1.000
(lower half: interest rates; upper half: capital returns)
Table A3: Performance of equal share' international financial market portfolio,1953-95
Interest rate  Capital return  Interest rate &
Capital return
Mean  3.0  10.4  6.7
Variance  6.7  558.6  295.6
Correlation  0.115
Table A4: Performance of a multipillar portfolio, 1953-95
Gennany  Japan  UK  USA
National portfolio with fixed
shares*
Mean  5.9  6.2  5.0  3.5
Variance  99.3  103.6  89.7  51.8
Correlation (W&(I&C))  -0.08  0.21  0.00  0.04
International portfolio with fixed shares**
Mean  5.7  5.9  5.1  3.8
Variance  42.2  53.5  44.7  44.0
Correlation (W&(I&C))  -0.140  0.167  0.184  0.218
National  optimal portfolio***
Mean  5.1  5.6  -3.8  2.5
Variance  10.7  35.8  8.5  11.0
Share of unfunded scheme  89.5%  78.4%  90.9%  70.7%
Intemnational  optimal
portfolio****
Mean  5.2  5.8  4.1  3.5
Variance  9.2  29.3  9.2  18.6
Share of unfunded scheme  79.2%  60.7%  84.6%  55.2%
* 50 percent  national  wage,  50 percent  national  financial  portfolio  with  equal  shares
** 50 percent  national  wage,  50% international  financial  portfolio  with  equal  shares
*  ** Maximizes  mean  to standard  deviation  of portfolio  of wages  and national  financial  market
**** Maximizes  mean  to standard  deviation  of portfolio  of wages  and international  financial  market
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The  paper  highlights  the  World Bank's  thinking  and  worldwide
involvement  in pension  reform. Both  are  driven  by the Bank's
mandate  to help  countries  develop  economically  and  to reduce
poverty.  The  Bank  has  four  key  concerns  in working  with clients
on pension  policy:  (1)  short-term  financing  and  long-term  financial
viability; (2) effects  on economic growth; (3) adequacy  and other
distributive  issues;  and  (4)  political  risk  and  sustainability.  In
response  to these concerns  and after review of the three main
reform options for unfunded systems  -mere  PAYG  reform,  a
rapid and complete shift to a mandatory  funded system,  and a
gradual shift to a multi-pillar scheme  - the Bank clearly favors
the latter approach, but in a pragmatic and country-specific
manner. When helping to implement  a pension  reform,  the Bank
takes  full account of country preferences,  circumstances  and
ownership, bases  its support on sound reform criteria, links the
client assistance  with knowledge management,  provides  training
and other measures  to enhance  the reform capacity of a country,
and seeks  cooperation with other international institutions.
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